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WHO OWNS TRADITION? 
RELIGION AND THE MESSINESS OF HISTORY 
Catherine Bell 
Professor, Department of Religious Studies, Santa Clara University 
I. Introducing the Problem 
The question of "who owns a tradition" is not a new one, but it is being 
debated today more clearly and more widely than ever before. It asks who gets 
to define a tradition, who speaks for it, whose interpretation is authoritative 
and, quite practically, whose books to read about it. Who defines "the Catholic 
tradition," for example? Those who see it as a unique revelation transcending 
time or those who would point to the histories of many church institutions 
over the last two thousand years? Likewise, who is the authority on what consti-
tutes "Buddhism"? Who should be the one to inventory what is most central to 
Hinduism, or provide the "real" history of Islam?' And with all these questions, 
are we asking whose definition is more correct, more legitimate or, perhaps, 
simply more dominant?2 
Answers to the question "who speaks for a tradition" depend in great measure 
on particular orientations to history. I want to explore this question by focus-
ing on three groups who, in their own ways, claim to speak for tradition. First, 
there are the scholarly types who more or less objectively chart a tradition as a 
more or less coherent entity over time. Second, there are the religious leaders, 
those with authoritative voices in religious institutions, who formulate what 
the religion is, its key events in the past, and appropriate attitudes and experi-
ences in the present. And finally, there are the practitioners, the communities 
of people who are the current bearers of a tapestry of beliefs, ritual practices, 
popular notions, and shifting attitudes-all appropriated in ways that accom-
modate and shape their cultural worlds. These are not mutually exclusive cate-
gories of course, yet arguably any one person is apt, I chink, to emphasize one 
of these roles over the others. In my comments tonight, I will try to do justice 
to all three orientations, but it should be no secret chat I am more the scholar 
than the religious leader or practitioner. 
If my question-who owns tradition-seems new to you, let me sketch out 
for you a scenario in which the question becomes very concrete. It may strike 
a chord of familiarity. 
For almost two decades, I have caught a fairly wide variety of courses, but I 
find myself in a very similar position in almost all of them. Whether it is a 
class discussing the history of Christian scriptures or Japanese Shinto, I have to 
decide whose history to present. Next quarter I am teaching my course on 
Buddhism, and once again I have to decide on the textbooks and assignments, 
all of which involve decisions on "whose history". Do I present the views of 
Euro-American scholars who can have very definite opinions on what consti-
tutes Buddhism, even arguing chat no such single, continuous tradition actu-
ally exists? Do I present the authoritative voices of the tradition itself, as in 
revered scriptures or the teachings of someone like the Dalai Lama-although 
which scriptures and leaders I choose will make a difference in what the class 
understands as Buddhism. Or do I present the current tradition as practiced 
by lay Buddhists today, what you will find "on the ground" so to speak and 
what you need to know to make sense of a visit to a Buddhist temple in Sri 
Lanka, Dharamsala, Kyoto, or our own Bay Area neighborhoods. The prac-
tices at such places often seem to have litde to do with what authoritative reli-
gious leadership or scholarship have to say. 
All three groups-scholars, religious leaders, and practitioners-have different 
takes on what constitutes the tradition. Of course, the most functional solution 
for the classroom might be to present the question itself and something of all 
three perspectives. But the deliberate coexistence of multiple views of a tradi-
tion is a situation chat leaves nothing the same. It is, in itself, full of tensions. 
Here is a major tension. Whenever I present the history of Buddhist teachings 
or institutions, chat is, the diversity of scriptures, teachings, and lineages, all of 
which may be considered Buddhist in the past or present, it can seem like I 
am crying to poke big holes in the cighdy woven fabric of my students' uncon-
scious assumptions or idealistic expectations.3 And many don't like it. Few 
want to hear about centuries of purely oral transmission, sectarian fracture and 
institutional fission, the late emergence of texts attributed to earlier figures, or 
rituals to advance one's material welfare in the here and now. It is not what we 
like to imagine for Buddhism, or for any religion.4 When we come across it, 
we can feel a bit disappointed. Discussion of these topics seems to deflate the 
possibility of the truth, or validity, or even the clear identity of Buddhist ideas. 
We can idealize religion, and then history seems to act as the great despoiler of 
idealism-and perhaps even faith. Should that be? What is this idealism that 
we have made so delicate and vulnerable? What is this history that we have 
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cast so blunt and rough? 
As you can imagine, the problem is not specific to Buddhism. Most Catholics 
do not really want to know the details of the history of the church as an insti-
tution. It is a rare group of Catholics chat would find the overall history of the 
papacy anything bur disillusioning-and no one wants to be disillusioned. If a 
scholar or priest or lay person should cry to present chis history, most 
Catholics would wonder what he or she is up to. Doing history in chis context 
tends to become part of the wrangling of liberals with conservatives, so pursuit 
of knowledge of the institution's history ultimately seems politicizing. In the 
Catholic church, as well as many other traditions, church leaders and scholars 
often see themselves in opposing camps: for scholars, church leaders are in 
denial; for church leaders, scholars are suspected of rude attempts at "gotcha."5 
Practitioners can feel poorly served by both groups. 
II. The Scholars 
Let me describe what I think scholars are up to. In the 18th century, the writ-
ing of history began to recast itself as a formal discipline, self-consciously 
embracing scientific principles. Like chemistry and physics, it was thought that 
history could uncover laws and the fundamental causes of things. 6 History 
could "explain" how events happened, just as the laws of Newtonian physics 
could explain the movement of bodies. In this view, there are "facts," objec-
tively knowable, which when organized in an unfolding narrative sequence can 
describe the causal relationships behind events. Historians may argue over 
which facts are the important ones, or which conclusions are justified by the 
facts, but there has been a great deal of consensus on the goal of doing such 
history. This is the "modern" view of history. It still generates useful and inter-
esting arguments, and remains a basic assumption behind much of what we 
think and read today. 
For example, the last twenty years has seen a very vigorous debate-among a 
very small group of scholars-over how to date the emergence of Daoism in 
China. Should we date this tradition from the appearance of its most famous 
text, the Daodejing, long thought to be authored by someone named Laozi 
about the fifth century BCE? Of course, new archeological discoveries are 
revealing this text to be several centuries later than that, much more a synthe-
sis of multiple works, and its author, Laozi, a fairly deliberate creation.7 We 
have long tended to date traditions like Daoism from the appearance of a 
foundational text, perhaps because "the book" is so important in Western reli-
gions-and so important to what historians themselves do. But another group 
of historians has argued chat there is no such thing as the religious tradition of 
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"Daoism" until the establishment of an organized ritual community in 
Sichuan about the third century CE. 8 For these scholars it is important chat 
priests in the Daoist lineages found throughout the Chinese-speaking world 
today invoke the latter definition, although most of our textbooks and all of 
our popular notions hold on to Laozi as founder. 
Writing about the history of Christianity, scholars often present views quite 
different from those of church leaders and current practitioners. As an example 
there is the latest in the "quest for the historical Jesus" project. In a series of 
conferences held over the past decade, dubbed "The Jesus Seminar," a small 
group of scholars concluded chat very few of the statements attributed to 
Christ in the Gospels were likely to have been spoken by him.9 Ocher scholarly 
studies debate the social and economic make-up of early Christians communi-
ties, or the activities of similar sects of the time, attempting to re-construe the 
very worldly reasons for Christianity's appearance and spread in its first few 
centuries. 10 
In recent years, however, the modernist assumptions behind how scholars do 
history have generated what is called the "postmodern critique." This critique 
argues that the narrative histories assembled by scholars for the last few cen-
turies have not been nearly as objective as they thought. Rather, these histories 
are shown to have always reflected the cultural and political context of the 
scholars and served various self-interested concerns-sometimes rather bla-
tantly. So many 19th century histories of Hinduism or African religions were 
written in ways that justified colonization and even conversion. Some post-
modern analyses show that a whole set of interlocking forces can shape our 
conventional notions of a tradition. For example, when European 
Enlightenment philosophers first wrote about Chinese Confucianism, they 
had rather incomplete sources of information, but they also selected what they 
wanted from chem. In particular, figures like Voltaire and Rousseau wanted to 
trump the European churches and Christian piety of the day by showing that 
it was possible to have a rational, ethical system with moral power but without 
superstitious beliefs. 11 So postmodern analysts today are showing how early 
European understandings of Confucianism were thoroughly wedded to the 
church-state conflicts so important in Europe at the time. The major source 
used by the Enlightenment philosophers were, of course, the writings of the 
16th to 17th century Jesuit mission to China associated with Matteo Ricci. 
With the hindsight of several centuries, and much more familiarity with 
Chinese historical literature, we can now readily see how these Jesuit accounts 
of Confucianism were also shaped by their conscious and unconscious agen-
das. In particular, some early missionaries argued that real Confucianism was 
not to be found in the semi-degenerate practices of the day, but in the pure, 
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ancient texts which, according to Jesuit translations, spoke of a single, absolute 
God in Heaven-just like Christianity. 12 
Postmodern accounts of the history of Western scholarship on Buddhism are 
equally revealing of the biases we can carry and the extents to which we can 
take them. Early Protestant translators were quickly convinced that the 
Buddhism they encountered in Asia was a corruption of a pure, primitive 
Buddhism-and they set our to reclaim this lost tradition themselves by 
explicitly translating texts rather than consulting any living Buddhist teach-
ers. 13 Indeed, these early scholars particularly noted that the Buddhism of 
Tiber-with its rituals, images, incense, and hierarchy-perverted the purity 
of primitive Buddhism just as the Catholic church perverted that of primitive 
Christianity. Indeed, they tended to see Tibetan religion not as Buddhism at 
all, bur as something they labeled "Lamaism." From the early 1600s into the 
1900s, scholars continued to analyze various Buddhisms through stereotypical 
contrasts between Reform Protestants and their view of the Roman Catholic 
Church-that is, rational, non-ritualistic moralism versus devotional, ritually-
elaborate authoritarianism. Needless to say, such biases made understanding 
the historical facts, even finding them, much more difficult. 14 
The implications of the postmodern critique are also the subject of debate, of 
course. Some scholars have argued that the rejection of claims to objectivity 
can be taken too far, appearing to foreclose even the possibility of objective 
history. And if all history is subjective, culturally determined, and shaped by 
self-interested agendas, then anyone's views-of Christian history or Buddhist 
history-are just as valid as any other. In that case, what do you say to those 
who deny the Holocaust, or offer historical rationales for white ownership of 
the land in South Africa, or cast an early inaccessible Buddhism as Protestant 
in spirit and later developments as degenerate Romanism? For this reason, 
scholars today are seriously arguing what to mean by objectivity and facts, and 
how to understand and counter their own inevitable biases. 
While religious leaders rend to see scholars as trying to undermine religion, 
most modernist and postmodernist scholars today do not see themselves as 
using history to undermine or threaten a religious tradition. On the contrary, 
they are very likely to see themselves as champions of the tradition-that is, 
champions of the "real" tradition, as they define it. In this role, however, they 
are compelled to challenge all other definitions of tradition-so postmod-
ernisrs argue with modernists, and scholars argue with the definitions of reli-
gious leaders and lay practitioners. But when scholars blithely suggest that reli-
gious leaders are in denial over the facts of their institutional history, they too 
can readily over-simplify. Scholars define "tradition" by looking for the facts of 
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institutional and ideological continuity over rime. But religious leaders are 
doing something rather different. 
III. Religious Leaders 
Religious leaders have the task of formulating a religious persuasion based on 
revelation, unique insight, or a sacred story. In doing so they need to organize 
things in two ways. On the one hand, they present a body of doctrines and 
beliefs as a timeless and coherent whole. On the other hand, they rake pains to 
show char this holism is rightly tied to the key sacred events of the past. 
Indeed, it is by defining a timeless holism tied to the central events of the past 
that religious leaders formulate an "on-going" religious tradition. In this for-
mulation, historical continuity is not a major emphasis-either for purposes of 
accuracy or legitimacy. Rather, a living, relevant understanding of tradition is 
built on the plausibility with which a set of ideas is presented both as a time-
less body of "truths" relevant today and as nothing less than "the truth" 
revealed in the past. 
Scholars may fuss about whether Christianity is really any one consistent 
thing, or whether it is accurate to think of Buddhism or Hinduism as coherent 
holisms-and in doing this they will find good evidence of the variety and dis-
continuities of the historical record. But they are not pulling the sheet back to 
reveal the small man operating the Wizard of Oz. To be a functioning religious 
tradition , I am arguing, does not require historical continuity, and the lack of 
it does not invalidate a tradition. For religious leaders, all it requires is the self-
conscious link of the here-and-now to the all-important-then-and-there. This 
is what makes a tradition vital, renewable, the past made in the present where 
it can shape its world. 
Ir is well-understood by theologians that a religious tradition is generated by 
fresh formulations that create relevant links to the key events of the past. If 
there were no innovative interpretations, the events of the first century CE 
would be locked in rime and irrelevant to later ages. Every religion has inter-
pretive strategies to ensure, in effect, a type of "on-going revelation": 15 through 
Jewish law, Torah continues to provide the main guidelines for orthodox 
Jewish life today; through theology, the mystery of Christ is still grasped as a 
dynamic event for Christians today; through the continuous emergence of new 
sectarian perspectives, the implications of the message of the Buddha are 
probed to reveal a new recognition of the essential message. 
Understanding tradition in this way does mean that we are never dealing with 
a pure and complete message that was gradually compromised by time, trans-
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mission, and all-coo-human representatives. Of course, religious leaders often 
underplay the degree of innovation in which they are involved. They can 
falsely imply chat nothing has changed over time, chat no interpretation has 
been necessary. The most dynamic traditions, however, are chose that recognize 
the way they put themselves together-often in the face of discontinuities that 
can leave scholars perplexed. 
Another corollary of chis view of religious tradition concerns diversity. 
Diversity actually feeds the dynamics of a religious tradition, even though chis 
may sound odd. Central ideas are formulated primarily through difference and 
conflict. Difference and conflict are the natural result of ideas becoming 
important to more communities. Ocher ways of interpreting and appropriat-
ing will heighten the demand on all sides for clearer positions, tighter holisms, 
and more plausible links to the revelatory events of the past. While some for-
mulations will become more persuasive, or more dominant, while ochers more 
marginal or localized, the scuff of diversity is the raw material and the context 
for the formulation of tradition by religious leaders. 
IV The Practitioners 
Practitioners are my third group offering a view of tradition. They are the 
communities chat consider themselves to be Catholics, Presbyterians, 
Unitarians, Quakers, Pureland Buddhists, or Sunni Muslims, etc. Their 
definitions of tradition are not usually explicit or official, instead they emerge 
in a culture of practices, customs, and attitudes. 
For practitioners, tradition is incredibly regional, even local. Practitioners are 
inevitably organized in groups chat quickly develop a form of cultural distinc-
tiveness. Each exists just independently enough in their own minds to be able 
to assume chat their way of doing things is perfectly right and natural. 
Communities chat develop a great deal of interaction with other communities 
will have formulaic ways of understanding their differences that protect identi-
ties. Irrationally prejudicial formulas are common. Sometimes interaction can 
lead to a fair degree of influence and blending, but even in the presence of 
concrete influence, such interaction can heighten the impetus for a distinctive 
local identity. Tension and friction are the result. For most practitioners, the 
"tradition" is not the international body in its social or theological forms-for 
example, "the Church" or "the Mystical Body of Christ." Rather, tradition is 
all the ideas, imagery, conventional practices, and local leadership that support 
and sustain how the community goes about doing things. 
Not only is the understanding of tradition invoked by practitioners particu-
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lady ahistorical, it is also much less concerned with the overall coherence of 
practices and ideas chat is so important to religious leaders. In most religions, 
practitioners are likely to downplay doctrinal matters and emphasize imagery 
chat is personally compelling with little regard for coherence. So my Irish 
grandmother could be fixated on the Mother of Christ to the exclusion of any 
other part of Catholicism, including sacraments, scripture, and certainly the 
authority structure. Or, the ubiquitous focus of ritual life in the Buddhist villages 
of Burma, northern Thailand, and Laos today can be the wonder-working 
Upagupta, whose cult is never mentioned in the early scriptures and was 
officially denigrated when it appeared in the 12th century. 16 
The tradition of practitioners can even involve a type of quiet resistance to any 
higher leadership chat sees the community as just one among ochers. Local 
groups are more accepting of the leadership exercised by a national or interna-
tional religious organization when the governing hand is rather lightly 
extended. Yet even then, local identity and autonomy is reinforced in many 
quiet ways. 17 Some of chis resistance can be seen in the various ways such com-
munities can ignore important injunctions. I grew up in a Catholic commu-
nity that generally ignored papal injunctions on birth control, with people say-
ing things like: "I know the pope is a good man, but he just doesn't under-
stand these things." There are profound theological implications in chat state-
ment chat no one wanted to draw out. The same people who may be devoted 
to the pope as a very personable figurehead, an icon of religious sensibility, or 
powerful media image, are also apt to identify important religious experiences 
outside the traditionally-approved mode, that is, experiences unmediated by 
their religious leaders. Every time a community sees the Mother of Christ in 
the window of another bank or apartment house, or the face of Christ in the 
gnarled bark of a oak tree, and most recently oozing holy oil-all immediate 
examples for those who live in Santa Clara county-you have practitioners 
exercising independence over how the sacred is to be experienced-claiming, 
in fact, chat it can be experienced rather directly and immediately outside the 
ritual life of the church. le is an old tension, of course, and not peculiar to 
American Catholicism: the more the ability to speak co and for God is vested 
in formal offices, the more popular claims to direct access will arise, whether 
they are meant as challenges or not. 
For religious leaders, tradition basically means timelessness-a coherent, holis-
tic truth that in its essentials is one with the truth laid out in foundational 
events no matter how distant they may be. For practitioners, however, tradi-
tion is the taken-for-grantedness of current local practice. Links to the past are 
assumed, but not explicated and explored. The emphasis on one's own world 
of experience and what sustains it is most important. So, the definition of era-
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dition found among practitioners readily conflicts with the definitions of 
scholars and religious leaders. But most practitioners are not particularly con-
cerned to notice or call attention to areas of overt conflict. 
V. Conclusion 
I have tried to demonstrate the simple idea chat there is no one way to define a 
tradition. Tradition is not simply an enduring historical entity, or the presence 
of Truth in time as defined by religious institutions, or just what a community 
of believers takes it to be. Each one owns tradition-and so no one owns it. 
But, you might ask, is one of these definitions ultimately better than the oth-
ers, or are they all in fact equal? I think it is most accurate to recognize that 
they exist for different purposes. Any one person, like myself, is apt to make 
use of different definitions on different occasions. It is also useful, I believe, to 
recognize that the way scholars, religious leaders, and practitioners each put 
together their understandings of tradition means that they can easily talk past 
each ocher or generate a fair amount of tension when they don't talk past each 
other. 
After recognizing the structural differences in how tradition can be defined, as 
well as the legitimacy of these differences, it is still necessary to go one or two 
more steps. Specifically, I want to draw attention to the way in which the his-
torical record, even when contested, is becoming increasingly important for 
religions in the modern world. In the emerging globalism in which we all have 
to locate ourselves, our communities, and our beliefs, there is constant and 
non-trivial interaction between the religious leaders and practitioners of differ-
ent religions and cultures. In its most benevolent form, as a type of generalized 
influence, the interaction of equally weighted traditions in proximity to each 
other means chat they will inevitably influence each other's basic self-
definition. Whether they have much or little in common, there is incentive to 
emphasize what they share and perhaps begin to see such shared ideas as more 
central to their identities than they may have been before. There are less 
benevolent forms of interaction, of course, as when traditions have major areas 
of overt conflict. Bue if they are talking, and not just battling each other in the 
street, it is the historical record, assembled and debated by scholars from all 
directions, that is being called upon to mediate their differences. The historical 
record can seem a relatively neutral ground, less under the control of any par-
ticular tradition. So it is becoming more important simply to how religions 
today coexist. In part, the historical record appears relatively neutral because it 
is outside so many traditions, but also because, at its best, it thrives on afford-
ing debate and corrective revision of the facts. 
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Here is an illustration of the trend I am talking about. The Dalai Lama, a key 
but not uncontested spokesperson for Tibetan Buddhism, is called upon to 
represent Buddhism in a world in which multiple Buddhisms must coexist, 
coming together and interacting much more often and fully than in other cen-
turies. In this context, Buddhist leaders' sense of the essentials they share and 
the significance of their differences takes on new forms. In a recent publication 
for Western audiences, the Dalai Lama presents Buddhism as a single, coher-
ent holism; but at the same time he argues chat the formulations ofTibecan 
Buddhism are not simply late developments or degenerations; rather, they are 
the ultimate realization of the original presentation of the Buddha. 18 Of 
course, he is clear, those other Buddhisms associated with South and East Asia 
have their own very real, but perhaps more partial, contributions to make. In 
laying out the truths of the First Turning of the Wheel of the Buddha's 
Teachings, the truths of the Second Turning, and the truths of the final Third 
Turning, the Dalai Lama both defines a Buddhist tradition in terms of several 
broad commonalities and gives pride of place to ideas that distinguish the 
Tibetan tradition. A Japanese, Vietnamese, Thai, or Sri Lankan Buddhist 
leader could never have written this book or been the intended audience for it. 
This book represents, I would argue, an early style of engagement in a global 
conversation among Buddhist leaders. On the one hand, the Dalai Lama's 
book invokes a language for talking about Buddhism chat goes beyond any 
particular interpretive tradition. It casts the whole as a single, impressive 
"world religion," marked by more unity than disunity. On the other hand, in 
the process of establishing these unities, the Dalai Lama has to make sense of 
the differences. As Buddhist leaders deal more directly and explicitly with their 
particular differences-such as the institution of the Dalai Lama itself-it will 
be interesting to watch how global and local Buddhisms come to be defined. 
Certainly, in publications and presentations over the last 15 years, the Dalai 
Lama has been very unassertive regarding some of the specific doctrinal ideas 
behind the authority of his office. To avoid pushing on this front is increas-
ingly natural and instinctive in a world where his office is very difficult for a 
non-Tibetan Buddhist to recognize or understand. 19 
There are other conversations going on, however, in which the role of the his-
torical record is more pronounced, with powerful ramifications for local and 
global Buddhism. These conversations are attempts to call Buddhism to 
account for specific local responsibilities and to rise above the cultural pres-
sures that might distort its adherence to the essentials thought to be shared 
with others. So Buddhists from one corner of the world are addressing 
Buddhists of another by calling attention to the involvement of Japanese 
Buddhist leaders in the ideology of colonial expansionism in pre-war Japan20 ; 
or the role of highly nationalistic monks and monasteries abetting civil war in 
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Sri Lanka21; or the invisibility of poverty, misogyny, and social oppression to 
Buddhist institutions in Thailand.22 In all such cases, Buddhists are asking each 
other in an increasingly global dialog: "Isn't Buddhism something other than 
this? Can't we be more Buddhist?" In this way, of course, the definition of 
Buddhism enters another stage. 
A more familiar example is found in the recent Vatican statements on Catholic 
and Christian relations with Jews.23 This has been a contentious issue, some 
would say since the beginning of the Christian tradition,24 but particularly with 
the enormity of the Holocaust-and the emergence of global forums in which 
an accounting can be demanded and not easily ignored. In responding to the 
distrust between these two traditions, this pope has not only taken the personal 
route of praying as a Jew at the wall of the Second Temple in Jerusalem. He 
has also explicitly engaged the historical record-at least in part. Acknowledging 
big sections of the historical record is vital to a constructive dialog between these 
two traditions. Offering apologies as evidence of internalizing the meaning of 
this history, that is the stuff with which a tradition can reformulate or redefine 
what it is. While the contributions of John Paul II's 1998 We Remember and 
1999 Memory and Reconciliation have been judged partial by some Christians 
and Jews, it is particularly interesting to note the historical accounting both 
within these documents and in the evaluations of them.25 There have been appeals 
on both sides to the theological ideas that Christians and Jews hold in common, 
and yet in the face of their differences and the specific issues of contention 
between them, it is the historical record that offers the hope of reformulating 
what each is as a tradition-in its own eyes and in the eyes of the other. In 
effect, the use of history here enables the Catholic tradition to transform itself, 
to break with the anti-Semitism of the past, to banish one type of historical con-
tinuity, and become more of what it now sees as central to its identity-witnessing 
to Christ by virtue of love for all people, some (being) particularly close brothers 
and sisters. This is a recasting, a revitalization, a redefinition of tradition. 
John Paul II has not only demonstrated the need to use history today. In his 
acknowledgment of Catholic historical failings, such as the more distant 
Inquisition and the more recent failure to protest adamantly against the hor-
rors of the Third Reich, he has also demonstrated the problems of dealing 
with an historical record. It is hard to admit mistakes while maintaining cer-
tain notions of authority. This pope has seen a way to do this, in part, by 
nuancing where exactly the fault lies. His statements acknowledge the culpa-
bility of sons and daughters of the Church, but do not attach culpability 
directly to the Church itself. Yet he does state that the Church takes on the 
weight of these faults for the sake of purification and renewal. This may not be 
a statement of full admission of guilt, but it is one that takes responsibility. 
11 
I should emphasize that appealing to the historical record as a neutral medium 
for dialog with another religious tradition or subtradition, and finding in that 
a means for reconfiguring the tradition itself-well, nothing about this is easy 
or instinctive for any religious community. Before the demands that accom-
pany modern religious diversity, it was not particularly needed. So despite the 
railing of scholars over the last two centuries, religions do not have a lot of 
experience with this form of historicity. Now that it is becoming not just 
unavoidable, but useful to invoke history as a neutral medium for certain 
interactions, we should not conclude that history wins out over religion. 
Rather, it means that religious definitions of tradition will find an historical 
consciousness increasingly helpful, if sometimes sobering, for the challenges 
of living in a multi-religion world. Some traditions will fight a few of the 
implications of this historicizing and dialoging-as John Paul II has followed 
his apology for Christian failings with a reiteration that Christian commitment 
to the uniqueness of the truth of Christ and the universal mission rooted in 
him must not be diluted by ecumenical goodwill. 26 But global diversity is the 
new context for being religious; it is not going to go away; no one religion is 
going to dominate it; and all will be changed by it, sooner or later. To be, 
lovingly, our brother and sister's keeper in this world today, we have to learn 
how, in what way to be a keeper of our brother and sister's religion. If our 
religious traditions are vital, they will probably see in this the opportunity to 
find a dimension of the original revelation that has never been so directly 
glimpsed before. 
In the end, is history the despoiler of idealism? Are my students, among oth-
ers, correct to wish to avoid the history of what they want to think of as a 
purer truth? If history is the despoiler of idealism, then our idealism is built in 
a very narrow and ultimately inhuman way-inhuman because it denies the 
relevance of so much human experience. If history is hard on truth, then our 
notions of truth must be fragile constructions rather than robust insights. 
Idealism is, of course, a very human trait; we can and do idealize many things. 
But to live by an understanding of truth requires something beyond idealism. 
Paul the Apostle spoke to this, as you know, in his familiar admonishment that 
being called to a life in Christ means putting away the things of a child, and 
ultimately embracing "difficulty" and "complexity" with courage and vision.27 
It has been said that a "scholar can hardly be better employed than in destroy-
ing a fear." 28 Well, I do not pretend to have destroyed any of the fears we have 
of history. I have tried, however, to address them as directly as I can and to 
argue for a view of both history and religion that does not pit them against 
each other in the ways convention has so long demanded. History cannot sim-
ply be an "expert's" view of what should be identified and traced in time. 
12 
Religion is not simply people telling bad history. And truth is not a pure and 
complete message dropped into the human morass where it is nibbled and 
twisted and pulled to pieces. History is something to be achieved; an interpre-
tation of the determinative events for any situation is always a goal and a chal-
lenge. History can bring a needed corrective to the isolation within which 
many religious traditions have traditionally formulated their self-understand-
ings. The growing embrace of history that we see today provides the medium 
in which religious people will increasingly work out what it means to be an 
American Catholic, an American Jew, a Japanese Buddhist, or a continental 
atheist. You know it will feel "messy" while we are all in the thick of it, but in 
exchange for an idealism of absolutes held tightly to our chests, we will be 
reassured that the full range of human experience is being caught up, 
addressed, taken into account, and appreciated. 
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